Published at The Orthosphere on 10th of June, 2025. This version has slight corrections.
What is it like to be a human being?
Writing a half-century ago, Thomas Nagel, in his essay What Is It Like To Be a Bat?, sent a wake-up call to purveyors of “[t]he recent wave of reductionist euphoria” who claimed to have explained phenomenal consciousness in materialist terms.
…we have at present no conception of what an explanation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon would be. Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless…no currently available concept of reduction is applicable to it.
He then reveals the purpose of his curious title.
[F]undamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.
This poses a severe problem for materialist analysis of consciousness.
Continue reading “What is it like to be…?”It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness. Without some idea, therefore of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of a physicalist theory.